Constitutionalism dictates that the government must only act within the four walls of the constitution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Constitutionalism is the most potent arsenal of modern democratic states against abuse of power by the government. The mere existence of a constitution is pointless if people do not strive towards adherence. Before we start discussing about adherence to constitution, there must be some degree of clarity as to what are the constitutional boundaries which the government cannot surpass.
In Malaysia, constitutional walls that define the legal status and impact of religion in the Malaysian Federal Constitution (MFC) continue to be a subject matter of speculation. This uncertainty has adverse effect to the stability of multi-religious and culturally-diverse society in Malaysia especially when it is exploited as political tools to instil fear and cause tension within certain segment of the society. Further, the same uncertainty has hindered the development of the Malaysian legal system especially the adoption of religious laws into the Malaysian public law sphere. It is critical, in the author's view, for this issue to be carefully studied and addressed because the pro-secular group's contention presents huge impacts to the Malaysian legal system and the position of Islam in the MFC. If secularism is taken as a basic structure of the MFC:
The Malaysian Federal Constitution: An Islamic or a Secular Constitution?
(a) the MFC must be interpreted based on secular approach and Islamic principles which are not in line with secular values will be ignored; (b) Islamic criminal law can never be implemented in Malaysia even via amendment to the MFC because the parliament does not have the power to amend a basic structure of the MFC; (c) notwithstanding Islam as the religion of the Federation, Islam shall remain for ritual and ceremonial purposes only and does not have special status but rank equally with other religions in Malaysia; and (d) laws relating to Islam enacted by state legislative assemblies (SLA) particularly relating to offences against the precepts of Islam are very likely to be declared unconstitutional.
Premised on the above, the objective of this article is to determine whether the MFC is a secular instrument creating a secular state or a religious document establishing a theocratic state. The methodology adopted is qualitative studies of the text of the MFC, particularly provisions which have religious element in the light of historical documents on which they were inserted and cases decided by the Malaysian superior courts which interpreted those provisions. In addition, the author also analysed relevant case laws decided by foreign courts as well as views on secularism and the doctrine of basic structure of constitution. 
II. THE ISLAMIC STATE AND HUDUD DEBATES

III. SECULARISM AND DOCTRINE OF BASIC STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTION
In this part, the author discusses two principles which are salient to the pro-secular group's contention that the MFC is a secular instrument making Malaysia a secular state.
Secularism
Some dictionaries simply define the term "secular" as "worldly" and "without spiritual element". According to Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, the term "secularisation" means:
The deliverance of man first from religious and then from metaphysical control over his reason and his language. It is the loosing of the world from religious and quasi-religious understanding of itself, the dispelling of all closed worldviews, the breaking of all supernatural myths and sacred symbols… the defatalisation of history, the discovery by man that he has been left with the world on his hands, and that he can no longer blame fortune or the furies for what he does with it…; man turning his attention away from worlds beyond and toward this world and this time.
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George Jacob Holyoake, a British writer who is said to be the person who coined the term "secularism" used it in about 1846 to describe "a form of opinion which concerns itself only with questions, the issues of which can be tested by the experience of this life." 17 The original usage of the term "secularism" by him did not expressly reveal the concept of resistance to religion but rather, it suggested the idea of focusing on this present life rather than speculating about any other life or afterlife. Holyoake clarified his idea of secularism by saying:
Secularism is not an argument against Christianity, it is one independent of it. It does not question the pretensions of Christianity; it advances others. Secularism does not say there is no light or guidance elsewhere, but maintains that there is light and guidance in secular truth, whose conditions and sanctions exist independently, and act forever. Secular knowledge is manifestly that kind of knowledge which is founded in this life, which relates to the conduct of this life, conduces to the welfare of this life, and is capable of being tested by the experience of this life.
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From the above excerpt, secularism is not intended to challenge the truth or credibility of religion but rather it is independent from any discussion about religion. It promotes accentuation to the material and upon this world rather than the immaterial, spiritual or any other world. The concept was developed as a non-religious philosophy intended to stress upon the welfare and concerns of humanity in present life, not the potential needs and concerns related to any probable afterlife.
The pro-secular group in Malaysia, while arguing that the MFC is secular, Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his god, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, thus building a wall of separation between church and state. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.
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In essence, secularism in the context of a state refers the principle of separation between government institutions and religious institution, preventing religion precepts from influencing the way through which a state is run by the politicians and preventing politicians from intervening the manners through which religion is administered by religious institutions.
The expression of "a wall of separation between church and state" does not mean mere separation but strict and total separation. This is evidenced from the words of the First Amendment to the US Constitution which provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" leaving no room for religion in the governance of the state. In this respect, Justice Black in Everson v.
Board of Education 20 mentioned:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion to another ... in the words of Jefferson, the [First Amendment] clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State' ... That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach.
Secularism is therefore, not merely independent from religious doctrine and influence but also prohibition of subsequent importation or incorporation of religious element in the name of maintaining the strict wall of separation.
This is the concept referred at least by Karpal Singh 21 and Steven Thiru, 22 based on the fact that they argued the adoption of religious laws offends the purported secular nature of Malaysia. Civic group Bebas member, Azrul
Mohd Khalib explained the perspective of the pro-secular group through the following words:
Secularism does not mean atheism. A secular state is a state that purports to be neutral in the matters of religion and it supports neither religion nor irreligion. When we look at the nature of a secular state and the relationship between the state and religion, what we are talking about is the separation of the state and religion...
Doctrine of Basic Structure of Constitution
It is a constitutional law doctrine founded by the Supreme Court of India which epitomises the idea that a constitution contains fundamental features which are so important and unamendable. the basic features of the Constitution. Can it not be said that these are indicate of the intention of the Constituent Assembly to give a permanency to the basic features of the Constitution? It is also a matter for consideration whether making a change in a basic feature of the Constitution can be regarded merely as an amendment or would it be, in effect, rewriting a part of the Constitution; and if the latter, would it be within the purview of Art. 368?
…The Constitution indicates three modes of amendments and assuming that the provisions of Art. 368 confer power on Parliament to amend the Constitution, it will still have to be considered whether as long as the preamble stands unmended, that power can be exercised with respect to any of the basic features of the Constitution.
In the above excerpt, the learned judge was proposing that there should be limit to the parliament's power to amend the constitution so as to prevent it from "rewriting" the constitution as a result of abolishing its basic features.
In 1973 …the Parliament has no power to abrogate or emasculate the basic elements or fundamental features of the Constitution such as the sovereignty of India, the democratic character of our polity, the unity of the country, the essential features of the individual freedoms secured to the citizens.
In addition, H.R. Khanna J. proceeded to make the following remark:
We may now deal with the question as to what is the scope of the power of amendment under Article 368. This would depend upon the connotation of the word "amendment". Question has been posed during arguments as to whether the power to amend under the above article includes the power to completely abrogate the Constitution and replace it by an entirely new Constitution. The answer to the above question, in my opinion, should be in the negative. I am further of the opinion that amendment of the Constitution necessarily contemplates that the Constitution has not to be abrogated but only changes have to be made in it. The word "amendment" postulates that the old Constitution survives without loss of its identity despite the change and continues even though it has been subjected to alterations. As a result of the amendment, the old Constitution cannot be destroyed and done away with; it is retained though in the amended form. What then is meant by the retention of the old Constitution? It means the retention of the basic structure or framework of the old Constitution. A mere retention of some provisions of the old Constitution even though the basic structure or framework of the Constitution has been destroyed would not amount to the retention of the old Constitution. Although it is permissible under the power of amendment to effect changes, "howsoever important, and to adapt the system to the requirements of changing conditions, it is not permissible to touch the foundation or to alter the basic institutional pattern. The words "amendment of the Constitution" with all their wide sweep and amplitude cannot have the effect of destroying or abrogating the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. It would not be competent under the garb of amendment, for instance, to change the democratic government into dictatorship or hereditary monarchy nor would it be permissible to abolish the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. The secular character of the state according to which the state shall not discriminate against any citizen on the ground of religion only cannot likewise be done away with. Provision regarding the amendment of the Constitution does not furnish a pretence for subverting the structure of the Constitution nor can Article 368 be so construed as to embody the death wish of the Constitution or provide sanction for what may perhaps be called its lawful harakiri. Such subversion or destruction cannot be described to be amendment of the Constitution as contemplated by Article 368.
In summary, the doctrine refers to the foundational features to the constitution which if amended, will have the effect of rewriting the constitution, altering the basic institutional pattern and "destroy" the existing constitution.
Doctrine of Basic Structure in Malaysia
The apex court has given two conflicting views on whether Malaysia However, the author wishes to highlight several noteworthy observations from the position taken by the apex court. Firstly, the notion of democratic state profoundly refers to a state governed by the majority will of the people.
It is the majority will that first established the constitution and hence, there should not be an impediment to the majority will to subsequently amend it. Otherwise, the impediment would undermine the fundamental of democracy. As majority will is reflected by majority vote in the parliament, to implement the doctrine which limits the parliament's power to amend the constitution is clearly inconsistent with the notion of democracy itself.
Secondly, while the Federal Court in Semenyih Jaya's case stated that the decision in Loh Kooi Choon was superseded in Sivarasa's case, no definite word used by the Federal Court in Sivarasa's case pointed that the Malaysian Parliament's power to amend the MFC is limited by the doctrine.
The closest words are "Unless sanctioned by the Constitution itself, any statute (including one amending the Constitution) that offends the basic structure may be struck down as unconstitutional." In this regards, the words "unless sanctioned by the Constitution itself" creates ambiguity in the proposition that the doctrine applies because MFC in Article 159 clearly sanctions the parliament's power to amend the MFC.
Thirdly, the rationale given in Loh Kooi Choon's case that the doctrine is not applicable because it derives from the Preamble to the Indian Constitution whereas the MFC does not have preamble was not rebutted in Sivarasa's case. Fourthly, the argument posed by the Federal Court in Sivarasa's case that Vacher's case should not be followed by the Malaysian court because the UK embraces the Parliamentary Supremacy Doctrine is not a strong argument. This is because the MFC itself vests the parliament with the power to amend the constitution and hence, any amendment made by the parliament to the constitution is in no way prejudice the supremacy of the MFC or implies that Malaysia adopted the Parliamentary Supremacy Doctrine.
In any way, by virtue of stare decisis (judicial precedent) principle, we stand guided by the Federal Court's pronouncement in Semenyih Jaya's and Indira Gandhi's cases.
IV. THE POSITION OF RELIGION IN THE MALAYSIAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
It is an established principle of constitutional construction that no one provision of the MFC can be considered in isolation but instead, a particular provision in question must be brought into view together with all other provisions bearing upon that particular subject. This principle has been reiterated again and again by the Federal Court in many cases including in Danaharta Urus Sdn Taking these points fully into consideration, we are agreed that Islam should be the national religion for the Federation. We are satisfied that the proposal in no way jeopardizes freedom of religion in the Federation, which in effect would be secular.
38
Based on the above records, pro-secular group argued that framers of the MFC intended it to be secular.
Despite the repeated emphasise in the preparatory works that the insertion of provision on state religion should not affect the secular nature of Persekutuan Tanah Melayu, nowhere in the MFC states that it is a secular document or it intends to establish a secular state. This is unlike France, Turkey and India which constitutions, in no uncertain term, declare the states as secular states.
Instead, the total opposite happened whereby the Merdeka Constitution contains many provisions on matters relating to Islam namely: literal interpretation of the provision must be given precedence. This is because logic tells us that the obvious discrepancy between the literal wordings and the preparatory works must mean either the drafter intended to totally deviate from the preparatory works or the preparatory works should be read in the light of the actual provision and not vice versa because preparatory works are not binding like the actual provisions.
If the case is the former, the preparatory works should be ignored in totality because reliance on them would deviate from the real meaning of the actual provisions. However, since there is no proof that the former is the actual case, the author is of the view that the latter must be the right approach to be adopted i.e. to understand the preparatory works in the light of the actual provision so as to avoid the provision from losing its authoritative value to mere preparatory works. Looking to both the provision and preparatory works side by side, the author argues what is meant by "secular state" in the preparatory works is not equivalent to secularism that have been discussed earlier but a loose usage of the word to merely reflect that Persekutuan Tanah Melayu is not a pure theocratic state. 43 The The author argues that there is a significant difference between the MFC is secular and the law adopted by Malaysia is secular. In the latter case, it does not mean the MFC is secular but rather religion-neutral and receptive to any law be it religious or secular for as long as it undergoes proper procedural processes required by the MFC. The Supreme Court's argument that there is no provision which nullifies law that is contrary to Islam does not prove that the MFC is secular but rather proves that it is religion-neutral because it neither nullifies law related to religion nor prohibit the legislature from making law on religious matters.
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The Lord President in the same case further argued when British ascribed sovereignty to the rulers (i.e. to a human being), the divine source of legal validity (which were the original system prior to colonial period) was severed and thus the British turned the system into a secular institution. In this regard, In interpreting a constitution two points must be borne in mind. First, judicial precedent plays a lesser part than is normal in matters of ordinary statutory interpretation. Secondly, a constitution, being a living piece of legislation, its provisions must be construed broadly and not in a pedantic way -"with less rigidity and more generosity than other Acts" (see Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1979] 3 All ER 21. A constitution is sui generis, calling for its own principles of interpretation, suitable to its character, but without necessarily accepting the ordinary rules and presumptions of statutory interpretation. As stated in the judgment of Lord Wilberforce in that case: "A constitution is a legal instrument given rise, amongst other things, to individual rights capable of enforcement in a court of law. Respect must be paid to the language which has been used and to the traditions and usages which have given meaning to that language. It is quite consistent with this, and with the recognition that rules of interpretation may apply, to take as a point of departure for the process of interpretation a recognition of the character and origin of the instrument, and to be guided by the principle of giving full recognition and effect to those fundamental rights and freedoms." The principle of interpreting constitutions "with less rigidity and more generosity" was again applied by the Privy Council in Attorney-General of St Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla v Reynolds [1979] Accordingly, the author argues that it is irrational to insist that the MFC is secular when the Federal Court had in many occasions decided the MFC empowers the SLA to enact laws on the creation and punishment of offences against the precepts of Islam.
Fifthly, the author had earlier ventured into the doctrine of basic structure of constitution. In this context, the author argues that it is illogical to say in the first place that something which is so fundamental to the constitution is being neglected from expression especially when it has been repeated numerous times in the preparatory works. This fact can be implied to mean secularism was not It is my observation that the words 'in peace and harmony' in art 3(1) has a historical background and dimension, to the effect that those words are not without significance. The article places the religion of Islam at par with the other basic structures of the Constitution, as it is the third in the order of precedence of the articles that were within the confines of Part I of the Constitution. It is pertinent to note that the fundamental liberties articles were grouped together subsequently under Part II of the Constitution.
From the above, the author further argues that secularism does not qualify as a basic structure of the MFC because it has been deliberately neglected from being mentioned in the MFC and instead, it is more apparent that Islam is intended to be a basic feature of the MFC due to its importance and frequent repetition in the MFC on various subjects.
Nonetheless, the understanding of Article 3(1) as suggested by Ahmad Fairuz that Syariah is the "second most supreme" law of Malaysia is also not 
V. CONCLUSION
There is no conclusive evidence to establish with certainty that secularism is a basic structure of the MFC. The pro-secular group heavily relied on the preparatory works of the MFC which no doubt mentioned that the insertion of Islam as a state's religion does not derogate from the secular nature of the 
